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QUANTUM MERUIT RECOVERY ON
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
CYRUS D. SCHABAZ
T HIS article is to deal with the unenforceable contracts, not those
unenforceable because of moral turpitude or immorality, but those
contracts malum prohibitum through some statute or settled public pol-
icy. The scope of this article will show what contracts are unenforce-
able, how recovery can be maintained nevertheless, and what is neces-
sary to show the implied contract, together with a recommendation as
to how the doctrine of quantum reruit should be extended.
The article will be divided into three parts: Contracts void under the
statute of frauds, personal service contracts, and Sunday contracts, to
be treated in the order mentioned.
At the outset the statutes under consideration should be set forth.
The section relating to real estate is 240.06.
Conveyance of land, etc., to be in writing. No estate or interest in
lInds,- other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning lands in any manner relating thereto
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared unless by
act or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same or by his lawful agent thereto authorized in writing.
Section 240.08 further makes void all leases not in writing and signed
by the party by whom the lease is made. Section 24O.lO, passed in 1917,
extends the statute of frauds to real estate dealers' contracts and makes
contract for commission on sale or lease void unless in writing, specify-
ing the terms, commission to be paid, and signed by the one agreeing to
pay the commission.
In order to maintain an action on a contract which must be in writing,
the statute must be followed closely. In Durkin v. Machesky there
was no contract but a mere receipt and description was "Southwest
corner 28th and Mfeinecke." This was held insufficient and the contract
unenforceable under the statute of frauds but the money paid under the
void contract was recovered back.
Our court has been loath to allow the defendant in such an action to
keep the results of a void contract. As early as Tollensen v: Gunder-
son2 the court has allowed the plaintiff to recover back his money paid
under a void contract.
177 Wis. 595, 188 N.W. 97.
'i Wis. H13.
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And why shouldn't the plaintiff recover? The contract is not tinged
with immorality. Nothing passes to the defendant by virtue of it and
he acquires no rights so he can be deprived of no advantage secured
under it. Recovery by the plaintiff leaves the defendant in the same
position as before and he is at liberty to dispose of his land.3
The doctrine of these two cases has been modified and extended for
the first time in Clark v. Davidson4 where the plaintiff went into posses-
sion under a parol agreement to purchase, void, of course, and the court
allowed recovery on quantum meruit for the fair value of his services
and this amount need not be the same as the contract rate. The court
stated this was no different than allowing the plaintiff to recover money
back paid under a void contract and on authority of the two early cases
gave judgment.
Then the case of Koch v. Williants was decided, in 1892, and has
been cited as a leading case ever since. There the plaintiffs were archi-
tects and agreed to prepare plans for the defendant, payment to be made
by conveyance of several lots. Defendants refused to convey and plain-
tiffs sued for reasonable amount for services. The court held the con-
tract void and said, "The statute must be complied with as long as it
is in force. The parties stand as if there had been no express contract
and the plaintiff may recover on quantum reruit for work done upon
an implied contract of the defendants to pay what the services are rea-
sonably worth."
This case has been cited and followed to date and is the present
Wisconsin law; Durkin v. Machesky, supra; Siefert v. Mueller,6 Nelson
v. Christensen,7 and numerous other cases.
The case of Siefert v. Dirk,8 passing on Section 24O.lO, regarding
real estate contracts was decided along the same line as Koch v. Wil-
liams. The statute provided contracts for payment of commission on
real estate sales shall be void if not in writing but the court by a vote
of 4 to 3 allowed recovery on quantum neruit. Eschweiler, Justice,
wrote a wonderful opinion for the majority, outlining the history of
the principle and tracing the cases down to date. The holding is that
Sec. 240.10 makes void the express contract only and the common law
right to recover on quantum meruit upon an implied promise has not
been legislated out of existence. Contrary to the holding of a similar
statute of Missouri valid by that court,9 our court held that the com-
'Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142.
4 53 Wis. 317, io N.W. 384.
82 Wis. 186, 52 N.W. 257.
'156 Wis. 629, 146 N.W. 787.
169 Wis. 373, 172 N.W. 741.
175 Wis. 220, 184 N.W. 698.
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mon law right to recover on quantum nweruit still exists, although the
express contract under which services were rendered is declared void
because oral.
So thus, if there has been a void contract to convey land but the
plaintiff enters and performs valuable services in spite of it the de-
fendant must pay for such service in money. This is no harsh rule for
the defendant because the statute demands such contracts be in writing
and, although the defendant never agreed to pay money but was merely
to convey a lot, by his ignorance in not complying with the statute he
is penalized and has no ground for complaint.
In personal service contracts recovery is predicated on quantum
ineruit in many instances as where no express contract can be proved
or when an entire contract is only partly performed.
The case of Wheeler v. Lucy Hall0 lays down the underlying prin-
ciple. Defendant and James were tenants in common in a mill and
James hired plaintiff to do some repair work. Plaintiff sues the defend-
ant for this work and the court allowed recovery, saying, "On the
principle that if one accepts or knowingly avails himself of the benefits
of services done for him without his request, he shall have to pay for
them, Lucy would have been personally liable to the plaintiff even
though James had employed plaintiff without her knowledge."
This recovery is founded on an implied promise, as there is no ex-
press contract with the defendant, and the plaintiff recovers the reason-
able value of the services rendered.
The rule has been stated again in Wojohn v. Nat'l Union Bank"
where the court said, on p. 667, "The general rule is thit if a person
performs valuable services for another, at that other's request, the law
implies, as a matter of fact, the making of a promise by the latter and
acceptance thereof by the former to pay the one performing the reason-
able value thereof."
So that, as between strangers, the rendition of valuable services by
one raises an implied promise of the recipient to pay and although no ex-
press contract can be proven, recovery may be had on quantum meruit.
But several things are necessary to raise such an implied contract. First,
the services must have been performed under such circumstances as to
give the recipient thereof some reason to think they are not gratuitous,
not performed for some other person, but with the expectation of com-
pensation from the recipient; secondly, the services must have been
beneficial to the person sought to be made liable.' 2 These are the nec-
' Rothw'ell v. Gibson, 98 S.W. 8oi.
10 41 Wis. 447.
1 144 Wis. 646, 129 N.W. io68.
SSegnitz v. Grossenbach Co., I58 Wis. 511.
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essary elements to recover and the case rests on the plaintiff's ability
to prove these elements.
Then there are entire contracts for. personal service. In Diefenback v.
Stark,1 3 the court held a personal service contract entire and full per-
formance necessary to recover. The consideration is entire on both
sides and there cannot be a recovery on quantum neruit for part per-
formance unless the plaintiff was prevented from completing the con-
tract by an act of God or some other cause beyond his control.
This is the present rule so that when the employee himself terminates
an entire contract wrongfully there is no recovery but if the employer
terminates the contract, rightfully or wrongfully, there is a recovery
against such employer. 4
Judge Marshal lays down the exceptions to the rule and allowing the
plaintiff to recover after part performance after having been rightfully
or wrongfully discharged by the employer and while the person dis-
charged may not sue on quantum meruit, his recovery must be upon
quantum meruit on the contract basis. The discharged servant is en-
titled in any event for his wages to the time of discharge, but subject
to deductions for his torts and deficiencies.
This case overrules the case of Green v. Gilbert" where recovery
was allowed after part performance but the contract was unenforceable
and so recovery was allowed, not for the contract price but on quantum
meruit.
But almost the same result is reached, that is, recovery after part
performance is allowed, but the Green case allows an action on quantum
meruit and judgment for more than the contract price while the Hilde-
brand case grants recovery upon quantum meruit on the contract basis
and limits recovery to the amount of the contract.
In the family relationship a different set of presumptions arise.
There, when services are rendered it is presumed that they were ren-
dered gratuitously and an express contract must be shown. In re
Schmidt's estate's the rule is, "Where near relations reside as one
family and one renders services and the other furnishes board and lodg-
ing, the presumption arises that neither party intended to pay or receive
compensation, and that they were intended as mutual acts of kindness,
done or furnished gratuitously."
But such presumption does not arise between married brothers about
forty-five years old with independent families and the rendition of val-
56 Wis. 462, 14 N.W. 621.
" Hildebrand v. The Am. Fine Art Co., lO9 Wis. 171, 85 N.W. 268.
21 Wis. 395.
"93 WiS. 12o, 67 N.W. 37.
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uable services by one raises implied promise to pay and recovery is had
on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of such services. 17
The presumption of gratuitous. service arising from the family rela-
tion is rebutted by proof of promise of father to devise land to son and,
though promise was void under statute of frauds, it is a sufficient basis
for quantum reruit recovery for the services rendered. 18 For the void
promise to devise real estate in consideration of services the law sub-
stitutes the valid implied contract to pay reasonable value.
Authorities are clearly'divided as to whether a woman who in good
faith believes herself a man's wife can recover on implied contract for
services if the marriage is, in fact, illegal. This is merely to note the
split of authority and while some courts allow recovery on quantum
reruit the majority rule allows no recovery, but our court in Estate of
Fax'9 allowed the plaintiff to recover but based recovery on the fraud
and deceit of the deceased.
While the holding is correct the theory seems wrong. The court
expressly says that the question as to whether there would be recovery
if both parties acted innocently is undecided, nevertheless they seem to.
infer that, except for the fraud and deceit of the defendant the plain-
tiff would not have recovered. So it may be said to follow that if there
was no fraud or deceit there would be no recovery. 'The question of the
misrepresentations of the defendant should be immaterial because the
action of quantum meruit is based on the right of the plaintiff to re-
cover, not on the position of the defendant.
So most likely when the facts are presented squarely before the court,
and both parties are entirely innocent, the court will allow recovery, as
it should, but change the theory to quantum reruit. Although there is
no presumption that the husband is to pay the wife for her services,
the wife intended to perform such service for her lawful husband only
and would not have entered into the contiact had the true facts been
known. So the woman should recover on implied contract, whether or
not the defendant had deceived her.
Now as to the last class of contracts, Sunday contracts. The Wis-
consin Statutes in reference to this are are 351.46 to 351.51 and pro-
vide a penalty for performance of any business or amusement on Sun-
day except the certain instances allowed expressly by these sections.
The question is whether a contract valid in all other respects except
that it has been executed on Sunday, can be a basis for recovery and if
there is no recovery on the express contract will the law imply a con-
tract and allow quantum mneruit recovery.
' Williams v. Williams, 114 Wis. 79.
" Laughnan v. Estate of Laughnan, x65 Wis. 348, 89 N.W. 835.
" 78 Wis. 369, 19o N.W. 9o.
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As for the loaning and borrowing of money on Sunday, the law is
settled that there can be no recovery. The early case of Hill v. Sher-
wood20 allowed no recovery in an action on a note executed on Sunday.
There is no quantum meruit recovery and the court in Froewert v.
Decker2 said, "The loaning of money on Sunday is illegal and the mere
fact that the person borrowing it retains it does not raise an implied
promise to repay."
Even as to goods sold and delivered on Sunday there can be no re-
covery as is seen in the case of Moore v. Kendall where neither the
vendor nor vendee can rescind the sale or recover back the property or
purchase money on a contract executed on Sunday. This is the present
Wisconsin law and unless part of the contract has been performed on a
secular day no right of action exists.
But if the contract is signed on Sunday and delivered on another day
it is valid.23 While the Sunday contract is void and incapable of rati-
fication,24 nevertheless, a void agreement made on Sunday may be vali-
dated by payment on a secular day25 and in the case of Schmidt v.
Thoimas 26 the court had gone a great length to get some consideration
to validate a Sunday contract. There the contract was for the sale of
an organ and stool for $65, the organ being delivered on Sunday and
the stool on Monday. The court held the contract entire and the subse-
quent delivery and acceptance of the stool validated an otherwise illegal
contract.
So the court attempts to allow the plaintiff to recover if there is any-
thing it can label "consideration," given on a secular day. But why
should there be an exception to the quantum meruit rule?
In personal service contracts the plaintiff can recover the reasonable
value of services performed under a Sunday contract, even though
the original case was stated in express contract and not until the trial
did the plaintiff amend to quantum mertit.Y This is merely a re-
statement of an old rule announced by our court many times.2 8
There seems to be no reasonable ground for the distinction between
these cases. Why should not the vendor of an automobile sold on
M 3 Wis. 343.
"51 Wis. 46.
=2 Pinney 99 (Wis.).
'Gibbs v. Sterrett, iii U.S. 597; O'Day v. Meyers, 147 W. 549, 133 N.W. 605.
'King v. Graef, 136 W. 548, 117 N.W. io58.
'Allen v. City of Greenwood, 147 W. 626, 133 N.W. 1094; Melchoir v. Mc-
Carty, 31 W. 252.
= 75 W. 529, 44 N.W. 771.
'7 Gist v. Johnson Carey Co., 158 W. 188, 147 N.W. 1079.
'Pearson v. Kelley, 122 W. 66o, ioo N.W. 2O64; Kiewert v. Rindsdorf, 46 W.
481, 1 N.W. 163
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Sunday recover the same as a laborer performing services under a Sun-
day contract? This is an instance where the doctrine of qztantum
meruit should be extended and just as valid a promise implied from
the delivery of goods on Sunday as there is from the performance of
services under a Sunday contract, the recovery on a contract void under
the statute of frauds or allowing the plaintiff to recover on quantim
meruit for part performance under an entire contract, where no con-
tract action can be stated and ordinarily there is no recovery.
